Early Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access, Risky Health Behaviors, and Self-Assessed Health by Courtemanche, Charles J. et al.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise 
Working Papers Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise 
8-2017 
Early Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access, 
Risky Health Behaviors, and Self-Assessed Health 
Charles J. Courtemanche 
Georgia State University, courtemanche@uky.edu 
James Marton 
Georgia State University, marton@gsu.edu 
Benjamin Ukert 
University of Pennsylvania, bukert@wharton.upenn.edu 
Aaron Yelowitz 
University of Kentucky, aaron.yelowitz@uky.edu 
Daniela Zapata 
IMPAQ International 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/isfe_papers 
 Part of the Health Economics Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Repository Citation 
Courtemanche, Charles J.; Marton, James; Ukert, Benjamin; Yelowitz, Aaron; and Zapata, Daniela, "Early 
Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access, Risky Health Behaviors, and Self-Assessed 
Health" (2017). Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Working Papers. 19. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/isfe_papers/19 
This Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise at 
UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Working Papers by an 
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Early Effects of the Affordable Care Act 
on Health Care Access, Risky Health 
Behaviors, and Self-Assessed Health 
   
Charles Courtemanche 
James Marton 
Benjamin Ukert 
Aaron Yelowitz 
Daniela Zapata 
 
August 2017 
 
 
 
 
Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise 
 Working Paper 10 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Kentucky 
244 Gatton College of Business and Economics 
Lexington, KY 40506-0034 
http://isfe.uky.edu/ 
 
 
2 
 
Courtemanche, Charles, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz and Daniela Zapata. 
“Early Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access, Risky Health Behaviors, and 
Self-Assessed Health.” Schnatter Institute Working Paper. John H. Schnatter Institute for the 
Study of Free Enterprise, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, August 2017. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The goal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to achieve nearly universal health insurance 
coverage through a combination of mandates, subsidies, marketplaces, and Medicaid expansions, 
most of which took effect in 2014. We use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System to examine the impacts of the ACA on health care access, risky health behaviors, and 
self-assessed health after two years. We estimate difference-in-difference-in-differences models 
that exploit variation in treatment intensity from state participation in the Medicaid expansion 
and pre-ACA uninsured rates. Results suggest that the ACA led to sizeable improvements in 
access to health care in both Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states, with the gains being 
larger in expansion states along some dimensions. However, we do not find clear effects on risky 
behaviors or self-assessed health. 
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Early Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access,  
Risky Health Behaviors, and Self-Assessed Health 
Charles Courtemanche, James Marton, Benjamin Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and Daniela Zapata1 
 
1. Introduction 
The goal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to achieve nearly 
universal health insurance coverage in the United States through a combination of policies 
largely implemented in 2014 (Obama 2016). Several recent studies, including Frean, Gruber, and 
Sommers (2017) and Courtemanche et al. (2017), have shown that the ACA led to gains in 
insurance coverage. The objective of this paper is to evaluate whether or not such coverage 
increases translated to changes in access to care, risky health behaviors, and, ultimately, short-
run health outcomes.  
A number of 2014 ACA provisions involved overhauling nongroup insurance markets in 
an effort to ensure that one’s health history did not provide a barrier to obtaining coverage. 
Specific regulations included guaranteed issue laws, which forbid insurers from denying 
coverage on the basis of an applicant’s health status, and modified community rating, which 
imposes uniform premiums regardless of observable applicant characteristics aside from age and 
smoking status. In addition, the federal government established a health insurance marketplace to 
facilitate insurance purchases for individuals and small businesses. Each state was given the 
option of establishing its own insurance marketplace, and 15 did so in 2014 (KFF 2014).  
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Chad Cotti, Andrew Friedson, Amanda Kowalski, Sara Markowitz, two anonymous 
referees, and seminar participants at Emory University, the University of Connecticut, Tulane University, the 2015 
and 2016 Southern Economic Association Annual Meetings, and the 2016 Association for Public Policy and 
Management Annual Meeting for their valuable comments. Any errors are, of course, our own. 
 
 
4 
 
These reforms alone would likely lead to an adverse selection death spiral, with the influx 
of high-cost beneficiaries causing relatively low-cost beneficiaries to drop their coverage, thus 
driving up premiums for those remaining in the insurance pool (Courtemanche and Zapata 2014). 
This concern motivated another component of the ACA: the individual mandate. Beginning in 
2014, individuals deemed to be able to afford coverage but electing to remain uncovered were 
penalized. The largest penalty that could be imposed was the maximum of either the total annual 
premium for the national average price of a bronze exchange plan, or $285 ($975) in 2014 
(2015).2 In addition, an employer mandate, which required employers with 100 or more full-time 
equivalent employees to offer “affordable” coverage to at least 95 percent of their full-time 
employees and their dependents (children up to age 26) or face a penalty, took effect in 2015 
(Tolbert 2015).  
The remaining challenge associated with promoting universal coverage—affordability—
was addressed by the ACA in 2014 in two ways. First, sliding scale subsidies in the form of 
premium tax credits (PTCs) became available to consumers in every state with incomes of 100 to 
400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) who did not qualify for other affordable coverage. 
Second, in states that opted to expand Medicaid via the ACA, low-income adults (with incomes 
at or below 138 percent of the FPL) who were not elderly, disabled, or parents of a dependent 
child became eligible for Medicaid coverage. Previously, Medicaid eligibility was typically 
restricted to those with low incomes among specific groups (categories of eligibility), such as 
children, single parents, pregnant women, the disabled, and the elderly.3 According to the Kaiser 
                                                          
2 The maximum increased to $2,085 in 2016. For more information, see https://www.healthcare.gov/fees/fee-for-
not-being-covered/. 
3 Prior to the ACA, Medicaid income limits varied by category of eligibility, with the federal government setting 
income limit floors and/or ceilings across categories (Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard 2016). In many 
categories of eligibility, many states opted for income limits above 138 percent of the FPL, such as the income limit 
associated with infants and pregnant women. For example, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 allowed 
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Family Foundation, 27 states participated in the Medicaid expansion in 2014, with three more 
implementing it in 2015 and another two in 2016.4  
Theoretically, the expansion of insurance coverage brought about by the ACA should 
increase access to care because of the reduction in out-of-pocket costs, but this is not 
automatically the case. On the demand side, newly insured individuals may not have sufficient 
knowledge of the health care system to easily secure a regular primary care doctor. Somers and 
Mahadevan (2010) report that only 12 percent of adults have proficient health literacy. On the 
supply side, concerns have been raised about whether there are sufficient numbers of primary 
care physicians to treat all of these newly insured patients (Schwartz 2012; Glied and Ma 2015). 
While the federal government increased Medicaid primary care reimbursement rates to Medicare 
levels in 2013 and 2014, only a few states fully maintained this “fee bump” in 2015.5  
Insurance coverage expansions could influence risky health behaviors—such as smoking, 
drinking, and overeating—in either direction (Cawley and Ruhm 2012). On the one hand, 
improved access to care among the affected population could translate to improvements in health 
behaviors via information, accountability, or treatments such as smoking cessation drugs or 
weight loss programs. On the other hand, insurance expansions can theoretically worsen health 
                                                          
states to cover pregnant women and children in families with incomes at or below 185 percent of the FPL. For those 
in expansion states that were not categorically eligible for Medicaid or were in categories of eligibility with income 
limits at or below 138 percent of the FPL prior to the ACA, the Medicaid expansion increased their eligibility. For 
those in categories of eligibility with income limits above 138 percent of the FPL, their income limits generally 
remained unchanged, other than adjustments associated with the ACA’s uniform implementation of modified 
adjusted gross income. 
4 The 2012 Supreme Court ruling on the ACA upheld the individual mandate (the primary mechanism to address 
selection issues) but made the Medicaid expansion optional for states. For further information on state decisions 
with respect to the Medicaid expansion, see KFF, Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/. 
5 Medicaid reimbursement rates are typically lower that those associated with private insurance plans or Medicare 
(Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard 2016). The purpose of the fee bump was to encourage more primary care 
providers to start seeing Medicaid patients, but the temporary nature of the fee bump may have reduced its 
effectiveness relative to a permanent fee increase. For more on state plans with respect to Medicaid primary care 
reimbursement, see Snyder, Paradise, and Rudowitz (2014) and Advisory Board (2015). 
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outcomes through ex ante moral hazard, as the reduction in financial risks associated with 
unhealthy behaviors incentivizes such behaviors. Moreover, income effects from gaining free or 
subsidized coverage could influence behaviors by enabling consumers to spend money they had 
budgeted for the direct purchase of health care on alcohol, cigarettes, and junk food or, 
conversely, on healthy food and gym memberships (Simon, Soni, and Cawley 2017). 
The net effect of insurance expansions on population health depends on the changes in 
both access to care and health behaviors and therefore is also theoretically ambiguous. The 
extent to which increased health care utilization translates to better population health depends on 
the distribution of affected individuals’ initial locations along the health production function. 
Evidence suggests that “flat of the curve” care—perhaps due to uncertainty over treatment 
effectiveness, the principal-agent nature of the patient-doctor relationship, fee-for-service 
reimbursement, lack of coordination across health care providers, or malpractice liability—is 
common in the United States (Garber and Skinner 2008). Moreover, the same issues with health 
literacy that could hamper efforts by the newly insured to find a primary care doctor could also 
limit their ability to understand and comply with treatment recommendations.6  
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of the ACA’s 2014 provisions on a 
variety of outcomes related to health care access, risky health behaviors, and self-assessed health. 
We separately identify the effects of the private and Medicaid expansion portions of the ACA by 
using an identification strategy developed in Courtemanche et al. (2017) to estimate the impact 
of the ACA on insurance coverage by exploiting differences across local areas in pretreatment 
uninsured rates. To be more specific, we estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DDD) model with the differences coming from time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local 
                                                          
6 Previous literature has shown a relationship between health literacy and health outcomes including health status, 
chronic illness, and hospitalization (Cho et al. 2008; Berkman et al. 2011). 
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area pretreatment uninsured rate. If our objective was merely to isolate the effect of the Medicaid 
expansion, this could potentially be achieved with a simpler difference-in-differences model 
comparing changes in states that expanded Medicaid to changes in nonexpansion states. 
However, identifying the impact of the other components of the ACA (e.g., mandates, subsidies, 
marketplaces) is more difficult due to their national nature. We therefore exploit an additional 
layer of plausibly exogenous variation arising from the fact that universal coverage initiatives 
provide the most intense treatments in areas with high uninsured rates.7  
Our data come from the 2011–2015 waves of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS), with the sample restricted to nonelderly adults. The BRFSS is well suited for 
our study for three reasons. First, it includes a wide range of questions on health care access and 
self-assessed health. Second, with over 300,000 observations per year, it is large enough to 
precisely estimate the effects of state-level interventions. Third, it was among the first large-scale 
health datasets to release data from 2015, allowing us to examine two calendar years of data after 
the full implementation of the ACA. 
Our results suggest that the ACA substantially improved access to health care among 
nonelderly adults. Gains in insurance coverage were 8.3 percentage points in Medicaid 
expansion states compared to 5.3 percentage points in nonexpansion states, while reductions in 
cost being a barrier to care were 5.1 percentage points in expansion states and 2.6 percentage 
points in nonexpansion states. The ACA also increased the probabilities of having a primary care 
doctor and a checkup by 3.0 and 2.4 percentage points, respectively, in non-Medicaid-expansion 
                                                          
7 Finkelstein (2007) uses a similar strategy to identify the impacts of another national program, Medicare, on health 
care spending. Miller (2012a) also uses this approach to estimate the impact of the Massachusetts reform on 
emergency room utilization without control states. 
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states, with the effects not being statistically different in expansion states. Gains in access were 
generally largest among individuals with lower incomes. 
However, the effects of the ACA on risky health behaviors and self-assessed health were 
less pronounced—at least after two years. For the full sample, we find no statistically significant 
impacts on any of the risky behavior or health outcomes in either Medicaid expansion or 
nonexpansion states. This general pattern of null results persists even among the lower-income 
subsample, though we do observe a marginally significant improvement in mental health in 
Medicaid expansion states for that group.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we review the literature on the impacts of expansions of insurance coverage. We 
divide the literature into studies focusing on coverage expansions prior to 2014 and those that 
examine the components of the ACA implemented in 2014. 
 
Effects of Pre-2014 Insurance Interventions 
There is an extensive literature spanning several decades examining the impacts of the receipt of 
both public and private health insurance on a variety of outcomes related to access to care, 
utilization, spending, risky health behaviors, and health. Additional outcomes considered in this 
literature include labor market participation, job lock, and other public program participation. 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) provide a thorough review of the health insurance literature, while 
Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard (2016) review the literature on Medicaid and Gruber 
(2000) reviews the literature on health insurance and the labor market. Here we provide a brief 
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summary of the evidence on the effects of insurance-related interventions on outcomes related to 
access, risky behaviors, and health. 
Causally interpretable evidence on the impacts of health insurance coverage dates back to 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 1970s–1980s, which randomly assigned 
individuals to insurance plans with different coinsurance rates and deductibles. Those assigned to 
a plan with no cost sharing incurred about 20 percent higher medical expenses than others 
(Manning et al. 1987). However, on average, this additional utilization did not translate to 
statistically significant effects on self-assessed health, smoking, or weight (Brook et al. 1983).  
A substantial portion of the literature focuses on expansions of the Medicaid program. 
Evidence suggests that expansions for children and pregnant women in the 1980s and 1990s 
reduced low birthweight (Currie and Gruber 1996a), infant mortality (Currie and Gruber 1996b), 
and avoidable hospitalizations among children (Dafny and Gruber 2005). However, other studies 
suggest that these expansions increased smoking among pregnant women (Dave, Kaestner, and 
Wehby 2015) and had inconsistent effects on their health care utilization (Epstein and Newhouse 
1998). Research has also found that Medicaid expansions for childless adults in the early 2000s 
increased self-reported access to care and health while reducing mortality, particularly related to 
HIV (Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein 2012; Sommers 2017). Studies of the randomized 2008 
Oregon Medicaid lottery found that Medicaid increased health care access and utilization along a 
broad range of dimensions and led to large, immediate gains in self-assessed health (Finkelstein 
et al. 2012; Taubman et al. 2014). However, no evidence was found of changes in smoking, 
obesity, or clinical indicators of physical health (Finkelstein et al. 2012; Baicker et al. 2013). 
Tello-Trillo (2016) shows that a large Medicaid disenrollment in Tennessee reduced access to 
care and self-assessed health.  
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Another branch of the literature studies the impacts of Medicare, the universal coverage 
program for US seniors. Evidence shows that health care utilization increases sharply at the age 
of eligibility (Lichtenberg 2002; Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2008), while mortality among 
patients admitted to the ER falls sharply (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009). However, other 
studies suggest that Medicare does not impact mortality more generally (Finkelstein and 
McKnight 2008) and slightly worsens smoking and drinking habits (Dave and Kaestner 2009).  
Several studies have focused on the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform, a universal 
coverage initiative that featured a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and 
subsidies similar to the ACA. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012), Miller (2012a, b), and Van der 
Wees, Zaslavsky, and Ayanian (2013) all present evidence consistent with the reform improving 
access to primary care. Van der Wees, Zaslavsky, and Ayanian (2013) and Courtemanche and 
Zapata (2014) find that the reform also improved adults’ self-assessed health, though an earlier 
study by Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) did not observe a statistically significant result. 
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) also estimate that the reform reduced body mass index (BMI). 
Sommers, Kenney, and Epstein (2014) present evidence that the reform reduced mortality rates, 
though Kaestner (2015) disputes this finding. 
Another series of papers investigates the effects of the first major insurance expansion to 
occur under the ACA: a mandate for insurers to cover dependents up to 26 years old that took 
effect in 2010. Evidence suggests that this dependent coverage expansion increased access to 
care (Sommers et al. 2013; Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi 2015) and general health care 
utilization (Chua and Sommers 2014; Akosa Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2015) but not utilization 
of preventive services (Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi 2015). Chua and Sommers (2014), 
Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi (2015), and Burns and Wolfe (2016) present evidence that 
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the dependent coverage provision improved self-assessed health along some dimensions. Finally, 
Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi (2015) document a reduction in BMI. 
Kelly and Markowitz (2009) take a different approach to examining the causal effect of 
health insurance on BMI. Rather than investigating a particular policy change, they use Lewbel’s 
estimator for instrumental variables without exclusion restrictions. They find that insurance 
increases BMI but not the probability of being obese.  
To summarize, the available causally interpretable evidence suggests that health 
insurance can impact access to care, risky behaviors, and health outcomes but that the effects 
often vary substantially across contexts. For instance, the effects of insurance on self-assessed 
health appear to have been large and immediate in the cases of the Oregon Medicaid expansion 
and Massachusetts reform but more modest after the ACA dependent coverage expansion and 
virtually nonexistent in the RAND experiment. As another example, only the Massachusetts 
reform and the dependent coverage provision appear to have led to weight loss. These examples 
underscore the necessity of obtaining credible evidence on the effects of the 2014 components of 
the ACA rather than simply relying on results from other settings.  
In particular, even evidence from the prior interventions that have the most in common 
with the ACA—Medicaid and the Massachusetts reform—may not be reliable indicators. In 
contrast to the narrower population targeted by Medicaid expansions, the ACA expanded 
coverage to a much broader range of low- and middle-income families and childless adults, with 
only part of the expansion occurring via Medicaid. Marketplace plans differ from traditional 
Medicaid in terms of cost sharing and provider networks. The effects of the Massachusetts 
reform and ACA could differ because of the relatively low pre-reform uninsured rate in 
Massachusetts, differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of those gaining coverage, 
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the relative public enthusiasm surrounding the Massachusetts law compared to the ACA, and the 
fact that the entire expansion among adults was done though subsidized private coverage in 
Massachusetts as opposed to the mix of public and private used by the ACA (Gruber 2008).  
Effects of the 2014 Components of the ACA 
Much of the early evidence on the effects of the 2014 components of the ACA focuses on 
changes in coverage. At the national level, simple pre-post comparisons find increases in 
coverage of 2.8–6.9 percentage points, depending on the time frame, dataset, and population 
group (Long et al. 2014; Smith and Medalia 2015; Courtemanche, Marton, and Yelowitz 2016; 
Obama 2016; Barnett and Vornovitsky 2016; McMorrow et al. 2016).8 Other recent work uses 
more sophisticated econometric techniques to isolate the impacts of different components of the 
ACA on coverage. Kaestner et al. (2017) and Wherry and Miller (2016) focus on the Medicaid 
expansions, while Frean, Gruber, and Sommers (2017) study the Medicaid expansions, 
subsidized premiums for marketplace coverage, and individual mandate. Using the identification 
strategy that we employ in this paper, Courtemanche et al. (2017) aim to estimate the impact of 
the ACA more generally, finding that it increased coverage by an average of 5.9 percentage 
points in Medicaid expansion states compared to 2.8 percentage points in nonexpansion states in 
2014. 
A growing number of studies examine health-related outcomes besides insurance. Polsky 
et al. (2015), Shartzer, Long, and Anderson (2016), Sommers et al. (2015), Kirby and Vistnes 
(2016), and Sommers, Blendon, and Orav (2016) show that the timing of the ACA coincided 
with increased access to care, while Sommers et al. (2015) also document an improvement in 
                                                          
8 Although we focus our discussion on national studies, single-state investigations generally reach similar 
conclusions (Sommers, Kenney, and Epstein 2014; Golberstein, Gonzales, and Sommers 2015; Benitez, Creel, and 
Jennings 2016; Sommers et al. 2016). 
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self-assessed health. However, it is unclear whether estimates based only on time-series variation 
are able to disentangle causal effects of the ACA from other national shocks. Three papers use 
difference-in-differences (DD) approaches to examine the impacts of the 2014 ACA Medicaid 
expansion on access, health behaviors, or self-assessed health after two years.9 Using data from 
the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, Sommers et al. (2015) find evidence that the Medicaid 
expansion improved access along some dimensions but did not significantly affect self-assessed 
health. Abramowitz (2016) finds that the Medicaid expansion was associated with a reduction in 
self-reported overall health using data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement. Simon, Soni, and Cawley (2017) use data from the BRFSS and find that 
the Medicaid expansion increased some aspects of access and preventive care use among low-
income childless adults. However, they find no evidence of effects on risky health behaviors or 
most of their self-assessed health measures. 
Relative to these previous studies, our main contribution is to present causally 
interpretable evidence on the effects of the full ACA—as opposed to just its Medicaid portion—
on access to health care, risky health behaviors, and self-assessed health. This is critical 
information in light of ongoing policy debates about the future of the ACA. While we adopt the 
DDD strategy of Courtemanche el al. (2017), our work is distinct because we examine outcomes 
beyond just insurance coverage, use a second year of posttreatment data, and use a different 
dataset (BRFSS instead of the American Community Survey [ACS]).  
A secondary contribution of our work is to offer an alternative identification strategy for 
the impact of the Medicaid expansion that relies on weaker assumptions than the DD approach 
used previously. Specifically, we do not need to assume that any differential changes in the 
                                                          
9 Additionally, Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein (2012) find that early Medicaid expansions under the ACA in New 
York, Maine, and Arizona were associated with increases in access to care and self-assessed health. 
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outcomes between the expansion and nonexpansion states in 2014 are attributable to Medicaid. 
Instead, our approach allows for other factors (e.g., underlying trends or enthusiasm for the other 
parts of the ACA) to contribute to this differential as long as they are not correlated with 
pretreatment uninsured rates.  
 
3. Data 
Our primary data source is the BRFSS, an annual telephone survey conducted by state health 
departments and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that collects data on 
preventive services, risky behaviors, and self-assessed health for all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. A random digit dialing method is used to select a representative sample of 
respondents from the noninstitutionalized adult population. The BRFSS is appealing for our 
study because its large number of observations, more than 300,000 per year, allows us to 
precisely estimate the effects of the ACA. This is important since only a fraction of the 
population is affected by the change in legislation, limiting plausible effect sizes. 
Our main sample consists of 19- to 64-year-olds from the 2011–2015 waves. We exclude 
individuals older than 64 since the ACA was not intended to affect the health care coverage of 
seniors. We begin the sample in 2011 because that was the first year in which the BRFSS 
included cell phones in its sampling. Since individuals who exclusively use cell phones are 
disproportionately young, this inclusion results in a discrete change in the sample means of many 
of our key variables (including insurance coverage) between 2010 and 2011. An additional 
benefit of excluding years prior to 2011 is that this limits the sample to years after the 
implementation of the ACA’s dependent coverage expansion, preventing confounding from 
differences in state dependent coverage mandates prior to the ACA.  
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We utilize 11 different health-related dependent variables.10 The first set relates to health 
care access since such access, specifically to primary care, has repeatedly been shown to be an 
important predictor of health outcomes (Starfield, Shi, and Macinko 2005). Our four access 
measures consist of dummy variables reflecting whether the respondent has any health insurance, 
had any medical care needed but not obtained because of cost in the previous year, has a primary 
care physician, and had a well-patient checkup (e.g., a physical) in the previous year. The next 
three outcomes relate to risky health behaviors: a binary indicator for whether one smokes, a 
count of alcoholic drinks consumed per month, and a continuous variable measuring the 
respondents’ body weight in the form of BMI.11 These are three of the leading causes of 
preventable death in the United States, costing 467,000, 64,000, and 216,000 lives respectively 
per year as of 2005 (Danaei et al. 2009; Cawley and Ruhm 2012). Another set of outcomes 
relates to self-assessed health status: a dummy for whether overall health is very good or 
excellent, days of the last 30 not in good mental health, days of the last 30 not in good physical 
health, and days of the last 30 with health-related functional limitations.12 Self-assessed health 
variables, though subjective, have been shown to be correlated with objective measures of health, 
such as mortality (e.g., Idler and Benyamini 1997; DeSalvo et al. 2006; Phillips, Der, and Carroll 
                                                          
10 Note that we do not utilize the screening (e.g., colonoscopy, mammogram, pap test) variables available in the 
BRFSS because, in almost all states, they are only available in 2012 and 2014. This means that 2014 would be the 
only posttreatment year, which would be especially problematic since the questions use reflection periods of a year 
or greater (e.g., pap test in the past year). In other words, it is not clear that 2014 would be a true “posttreatment” 
year for these outcomes, since part of the reflection period for respondents surveyed in that year would occur prior 
to the ACA taking effect. 
11 Results are robust to using an indicator for obesity (BMI ≥ 30) rather than continuous BMI. Self-reports of weight 
and height are well-known to suffer from measurement error, but studies implementing a correction method 
involving validation data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey have repeatedly shown that 
adjusting for this error does not affect the signs and significance of coefficient estimates (e.g., Cawley 2004; 
Courtemanche, Pinkston, and Stewart 2015). 
12 We also run alternative specifications where the dependent variable is equal to a dummy for whether overall 
health is good or better, a dummy for whether overall health is excellent, and a summary index of health that 
incorporates the three health behaviors, overall self-assessed health, and the three self-assessments that pertain to 
physical/mental health. These additional specifications produce results that are consistent with those presented in 
table 3. 
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2010). While one might initially be skeptical that insurance expansions could meaningfully 
affect health in their first two years, prior evidence from the randomized Oregon Medicaid 
experiment (Finkelstein et al. 2012) and the Massachusetts universal coverage initiative (Van der 
Wees, Zaslavsky, and Ayanian 2013; Courtemanche and Zapata 2014) has shown that immediate 
gains in self-assessed health can indeed occur. 
We include a wide range of control variables. The controls from the BRFSS are dummy 
variables for age groups (five-year increments from 25–29 to 60–64, with 19–24 as the reference 
group), gender, race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic white, with 
“other” as the reference group), marital status, education (high school degree, some college, and 
college graduate, with less than a high school degree as the reference group), household income 
($10,000–$15,000, $15,000–$20,000, $20,000–$25,000, $25,000–$35,000, $35,000–$50,000, 
$50,000–$75,000, and >$75,000, with <$10,000 as the reference group), number of children in 
the household (zero to four, with five or more as the reference group), whether the respondent 
reports a primary occupation of student, and whether the respondent is unemployed. We also 
control for the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ seasonally adjusted monthly state unemployment rate 
as well as dummy variables for whether states set up their own insurance exchanges and whether 
these exchanges experienced glitches (KFF 2014; Kowalski 2014). 
A critical variable for our identification strategy is the uninsured rate in the respondent’s 
“local area” in the pretreatment year of 2013, which we compute within our BRFSS sample. The 
BRFSS does not contain county-level identifiers continuously throughout our period of analysis, 
making it impossible for us to compute county-level uninsured rates. Instead, we use information 
collected on type of location within a state. The BRFSS reports whether the respondents reside in 
the center city of an MSA, outside the center city of an MSA but inside the county containing the 
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center city, inside a suburban county of the MSA, or not in an MSA. However, no location 
information was collected from cell-phone respondents. We use this location variable to 
construct four subgroups within each state: within a central city, suburbs, non-MSA, and location 
unavailable (i.e., cell phone sample). Based on these within-state classifications, we calculate the 
pretreatment average uninsured rates by location (considering “cell phone” to be a location for 
the sake of convenience) within a state. To ensure that each area contains a sufficient number of 
respondents to reliably compute pretreatment uninsured rates, we combine the seven areas with 
fewer than 200 respondents in 2013 with other areas.13 After doing this, there are 194 areas with 
2013 uninsured rates computed from 219 to 5,804 respondents, with the average being 1,475 and 
the median being 1,205.  
Our Medicaid expansion variable comes from the Kaiser Family Foundation, a nonprofit 
organization that collects a vast array of health policy information. This information includes 
whether a state implemented the Medicaid expansion as well as whether this expansion was done 
through private insurance via a Section 1115 waiver. Expanding under the Section 1115 waiver, 
as done by Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan, introduced cost sharing and premiums for enrollees 
and could therefore have had different effects than expanding via traditional Medicaid. We 
attempted to test for such differences, but statistical power was insufficient to draw meaningful 
conclusions; we therefore simply classify the Section 1115 waiver states as being Medicaid 
expanders. Thus, a total of 27 states (including the District of Columbia) participated in the 2014 
Medicaid expansion and 30 states (including the District of Columbia) expanded by the end of 
2015. 
                                                          
13 Specifically, we combine the central city and suburban parts of Wyoming into one area, and we do the same for 
Vermont, South Dakota, and Montana. We also combine the suburban and rural parts of Massachusetts, Arizona, 
and California. 
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In our main specifications, we simply classify the 30 states that expanded Medicaid by 
2015 as the treatment group for the Medicaid expansion and the other 21 as the control group. 
The majority of the expansion states implemented their expansion in January 2014, with some 
exceptions. Michigan’s expansion took effect in April 2014 and New Hampshire’s in August 
2014. In 2015, Indiana and Alaska expanded Medicaid in February and September, respectively. 
States are classified as part of the treatment group beginning the month of their expansion. 
 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
 Full 
Sample 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Nonexpansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Nonexpansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Any Insurance 
Coverage 
0.788 
(0.409) 
0.791 
(0.407) 
0.868 
(0.339) 
0.710 
(0.454) 
0.805 
(0.396) 
Primary Care Doctor  0.741 
(0.439) 
0.745 
(0.436) 
0.826 
(0.378) 
0.682 
(0.465) 
0.754 
(0.431) 
Cost Barrier to Care 
in Past Year 
0.192 
(0.394) 
0.202 
(0.401) 
0.144 
(0.351) 
0.241 
(0.427) 
0.187 
(0.389) 
Well-Patient Doctor 
Visit in Past Year 
0.627 
(0.484) 
0.586 
(0.492) 
0.673 
(0.469) 
0.632 
(0.482) 
0.629 
(0.483) 
Overall Health Very 
Good or Excellent 
0.535 
(0.499) 
0.511 
(0.499) 
0.565 
(0.496) 
0.505 
(0.499) 
0.544 
(0.498) 
Days Not in Good 
Physical Health in 
Past Month 
3.660 
(7.964) 
4.489 
(8.639) 
3.940 
(8.073) 
4.149 
(8.362) 
4.099 
(8.326) 
Days Not in Good 
Mental Health in Past 
Month 
4.118 
(8.210) 
4.486 
(8.960) 
3.758 
(8.127) 
3.755 
(8.154) 
3.678 
(8.095) 
Days with Health-
Related Limitations in 
Past Month 
2.518 
(6.797) 
3.066 
(7.505) 
2.553 
(6.877) 
2.572 
(6.463) 
2.570 
(6.975) 
BMI 27.875 
(6.282) 
28.002 
(6.331) 
27.848 
(6.208) 
28.202 
(6.462) 
28.187 
(6.435) 
Smoking Status 0.216 
(0.412) 
0.212 
(0.408) 
0.195 
(0.396) 
0.218 
(0.420) 
0.244 
(0.429) 
Drinks per Month 14.285 
(35.824) 
13.080 
(32.600) 
13.782 
(32.187) 
14.103 
(37.640) 
13.740 
(35.173) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
19 
 
Table 1 provides pretreatment means and standard deviations of the dependent variables, 
while online appendix table A1 does the same for the controls.14 We also report the summary 
statistics stratified into four groups based on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid 
and whether her local area’s pretreatment uninsured rate was above or below the median for 
individuals in the sample. According to table 1, 79 percent of the sample had insurance at 
baseline. For both the high- and low-uninsured rate subgroups, individuals in Medicaid 
expansion states were slightly more likely to have insurance prior to 2014 than those in 
nonexpansion states. Residents of Medicaid expansion states and states with pre-ACA uninsured 
rates below the median (column 3) had, on average, better health care access and self-assessed 
health than their counterparts even before the ACA was implemented. They were also more 
educated, more likely to be employed, and had higher incomes according to appendix table A1. 
Our econometric design will account for these baseline differences. 
Figures 1–3 show how the average values of the outcome variables change across the 
sample period for four groups stratified by state Medicaid expansion status and local area 
pretreatment uninsured rate (above or below the median). The graphs show that the pretreatment 
trends were generally similar along these dimensions for most outcomes. Later, we will test our 
DDD model’s identifying assumptions more formally through an event study analysis.15 In the 
posttreatment period (2014 and 2015), figure 1 shows improvements in all access measures for 
all four groups, with the exception of the well-patient checkup variable for the least heavily 
treated group (low baseline uninsured rate in non-Medicaid-expansion state). For all access 
                                                          
14 The online appendix is available at http://www2.gsu.edu/~ecojhm/courtemanche_et_al_SEJ_online_appendix.pdf. 
15 Some divergence in pretreatment trends is evident for self-reported overall and physical health as well as 
functional limitations. However, the event-study regressions will generally indicate that our econometric model 
performs well for these outcomes, suggesting that our DDD strategy—which will account for differential trends 
between Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states as well as the control variables discussed above—adequately 
accounts for the sources of these divergent trends. 
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outcomes, the gains are largest among the most heavily treated group (high uninsured rate, 
Medicaid expansion state). In figures 2 and 3, we see that changes in the health behavior and 
self-assessed health outcomes after the ACA do not appear to exhibit as clear a pattern. In most 
cases, the changes appear to simply reflect the continuation of pretreatment trends, while in other 
cases (e.g., days not in good physical health, days with functional limitations), some groups 
experience gains and others losses. In sum, the graphs provide preliminary evidence that the 
ACA’s effects on health care access were more pronounced than those on behaviors and health. 
We next turn to econometric analysis to investigate these effects more rigorously. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Health Care Access Variables over Time by State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Local Area Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
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Figure 2: Changes in Health Behavior Variables over Time by State Medicaid Expansion 
Status and Local Area Pretreatment Uninsured Rate  
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Figure 3: Changes in Self-Assessed Health Variables over Time by State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Local Area Pretreatment Uninsured Rate  
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period fixed effects while still identifying the effects of the national (private) portion of the law. 
For simplicity, we refer to this method as a DDD, though we acknowledge that it is slightly 
different from a conventional DDD since pretreatment uninsured rate is a continuous variable. 
Assuming that the extent of a geographic area’s treatment is proportional to its baseline 
uninsured rate, the DDD model is  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾2(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾3(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾4𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                           (1) 
where 
• 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the outcome for individual i in area type (central city, rest of MSA, non-MSA, 
cell phone) a in state s in time period (month/year) t, 
• 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether period t is in the posttreatment period of January 2014 
or later,  
• 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables, 
• 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether state s participated in the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion,  
• 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the pretreatment (2013) uninsured rate in area type a within state s, 
• 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents time fixed effects for each month or year * area type combination (e.g., 
central city in January 2011); these not only control for time as flexibly as possible but 
also allow time trends to evolve differentially across individuals living in central city, 
suburban, and rural areas as well as those with only cell phones, 
• 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents fixed effects for each geographic area (e.g., central city in Alabama), 
• and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
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Note that 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is not included in the model since it is captured by the time fixed effects, while 
the terms 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 are not separately included since they are captured by 
the area fixed effects.  
In (1), the effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion is given by 
𝛾𝛾1 * 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which means it is assumed to be zero in a (hypothetical) area with a 0 
percent uninsured rate at baseline and to increase linearly as the pre-ACA uninsured rate rises. 
(We have also experimented with nonlinear functional forms for the uninsured rate and found 
that they do not reveal any meaningful new information.) The identifying assumption is that, in 
the absence of the treatment, any changes in the outcomes that would have occurred in 2014–
2015 would not have varied differentially by area uninsured rates, conditional on the controls. 
We do not need to assume that there would have been no changes at all in the outcomes without 
the ACA (conditional on the controls), as would be the case in a pre-post comparison that did not 
utilize the variation in pretreatment uninsured rates.  
The effect of the Medicaid expansion is given by 𝛾𝛾3 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. As with the other 
components of the ACA, the impact of the Medicaid expansion is now assumed to vary linearly 
with the state’s baseline uninsured rate. (Again, we found that considering nonlinear functional 
forms did not reveal new information.) Since the Medicaid expansion should not causally affect 
insurance coverage in an area with a 0 percent baseline uninsured rate, we consider 𝛾𝛾2 to reflect 
unobserved confounders rather than capturing part of the expansion’s causal effect. This 
interpretation follows Miller (2012a) and Courtemanche et al. (2017). The identifying 
assumption for the impact of the Medicaid expansion is therefore that, without the ACA, 
differential changes in the outcomes in 2014–2015 between Medicaid expansion and 
nonexpansion states would not have been correlated with 2013 uninsured rates. This is a weaker 
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assumption than would be required by a DD model, in which case one would have to assume 
that, conditional on the controls, there would have been no differential changes across expansion 
and nonexpansion states. 
 
Robustness Checks 
We also conduct a number of robustness checks. The first several vary the set of control 
variables to address the possible concern that some of them could be endogenous to the ACA. 
Recall that the baseline model includes the following controls: demographic (age, gender, and 
race/ethnicity), family (education, marital status, and number of children), economic (income, 
employment and student status, and unemployment rate), and health insurance exchange 
(interactions of year = 2014 with whether the state set up its own exchange and whether the 
exchange had glitches). The first four robustness checks include only subsets of these variables: 
demographic controls only, demographic and family controls, demographic and economic 
controls, and demographic and exchange controls.  
Next, recall that we do not know geographic area type (central city, suburbs, or rural) for 
individuals interviewed on a cell phone, necessitating our combining of all such individuals into 
a separate group within each state. The next robustness check aims to ensure that this decision 
does not meaningfully influence the results by dropping those interviewed on cell phones, 
ensuring the availability of the area type variable for everyone in the sample. 
The following set of robustness checks addresses the potential concern that interacting 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 with the same uninsured rate variable may be problematic 
since the Medicaid and private portions of the ACA applied to different income ranges (at or 
below 138 percent of the FPL for Medicaid, above 138 percent in Medicaid expansion states, and 
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above 100 percent in nonexpansion states for the exchanges/subsidies). The first such check 
interacts 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 with the pre-ACA uninsured rate for respondents above 100 percent of the FPL 
and 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 with the rate for those at or below 138 percent. Additional 
specifications use a 100 percent cutoff for both groups and a 138 percent cutoff for both groups.  
Next, we consider alternative approaches to computing pretreatment uninsured rates that 
utilize a larger number of individuals per area than our baseline strategy. This addresses possible 
concerns about using groups narrower than state to construct this key variable. First, we pool all 
three pretreatment years when computing baseline uninsured rates rather than just using 2013 in 
order to increase the number of individuals in each area. Second, we drop the substate 
classifications and compute pretreatment uninsured rates at the state level (using just 2013).  
In another robustness check, we drop 19–25 year olds. Since this age group was treated 
by the 2010 ACA dependent coverage provision, their treatment status is somewhat ambiguous. 
With that said, Courtemanche et al. (2017) find that this age group still experienced large 
coverage gains in response to the 2014 ACA provisions, so we do not expect dropping 19- to 25-
year-olds to meaningfully impact our results. 
The remaining robustness checks deal with the potentially ambiguous Medicaid 
expansion treatment status of some states, as many states partially expanded Medicaid under the 
ACA prior to 2014. One approach restricts the sample to only the nine treatment states and 20 
control states that did not have some form of Medicaid expansion prior to January 2014, as 
classified by Kaestner et al. (2017). Another uses the same nine treatment states but the full 
control group. Next, we only exclude the five states that Kaestner et al. (2017) describe as having 
comprehensive early Medicaid expansions prior to 2014. Our final robustness check drops the 
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states that expanded Medicaid in 2014 or 2015 but whose expansion was not effective as of 
January 1, 2014.  
 
5. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results from the baseline DDD regression for each outcome. The top 
panel presents the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the variables of interest, while the 
bottom panel gives the implied effects of the ACA at the average pretreatment uninsured rate. 
Indicators of statistical significance at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent, and 5 percent level are also 
shown. 
We begin our discussion with the outcomes related to access: insurance coverage, having 
a primary care doctor, cost being a barrier to care in the past 12 months, and checkup in the past 
12 months, which are in the first four columns of table 2. Because the cost barrier and checkup 
variables reflect information from the past 12 months, treatment status in 2014 is ambiguous for 
these outcomes. For instance, for someone interviewed in March 2014, only three of the 12 
months that determine one’s answer to these questions are actually in the posttreatment period. 
We therefore drop 2014 in the regressions for these outcomes, explaining their smaller sample 
size.  
The results suggest that the private portion of the ACA increased access to care along all 
observable dimensions. The top panel of the table shows that each percentage point increase in 
exposure to the ACA (measured by the baseline uninsured rate) increased the probability of 
having health insurance coverage by 0.259 percentage points, the probability of having a primary 
care doctor by 0.148 percentage points, and the probability of having a regular checkup by 0.119 
percentage points, while reducing the probability of cost being a barrier to care by 0.127 
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percentage points. These impacts translate to increases in the probabilities of having insurance 
coverage, a primary care doctor, and a well-patient checkup of 5.3, 3.0, and 2.4 percentage 
points, respectively, and a reduction in the probability of cost being a barrier to care of 2.6 
percentage points at the sample mean pretreatment uninsured rate. The ACA therefore led to 
sizeable improvements in access even in states that did not expand Medicaid. 
The Medicaid expansion led to additional gains in access along some dimensions. At the 
average pretreatment uninsured rate, it increased insurance coverage by a statistically significant 
3.1 percentage points and reduced the probability of reporting cost being a barrier to care by 2.5 
percentage points. We do not find significant effects on having a primary care doctor or a well-
patient checkup, though the magnitude for checkup is an economically meaningful 1.2 
percentage points—around two-fifths as large as the effect on insurance.16 Our finding that the 
Medicaid expansion increased access along some but not all dimensions is broadly consistent 
with the results from the DD studies by Sommers et al. (2015) and Simon, Soni, and Cawley 
(2017).17 
 
                                                          
16 Both of the access variables for which we did not find statistically significant effects of the Medicaid expansion 
relate to primary care. One possible explanation is that newly enrolled Medicaid recipients may still have trouble 
accessing primary care, perhaps due to the temporary nature of the ACA Medicaid fee bump (MACPAC 2015) 
leading to a smaller than expected change in physician Medicaid participation and/or some degree of access crowd-
out due to the concurrent expansion of private (i.e., marketplace) coverage. However, since the magnitude of the 
estimated effect on checkups is meaningfully large despite its statistical insignificance, we are reluctant to strongly 
push this explanation. 
17 The only noteworthy differences for specific access outcomes are that we find evidence of an effect on cost being 
a barrier to care but not having a primary care doctor, whereas the reverse is true for Sommers et al. (2015) and 
Simon, Soni, and Cawley (2017). In our view, the difference in results for cost being a barrier to care is not a major 
discrepancy, as Sommers et al. (2015) and Simon, Soni, and Cawley (2017) find the same signs and magnitudes that 
are only slightly smaller than ours—their estimates just do not quite reach statistical significance. The discrepancy in 
results for primary care doctor is more substantial, as our point estimate is essentially zero. In unreported regressions 
(available upon request), we replicated Simon, Soni, and Cawley’s DD model and restriction of the sample to those 
with incomes below 100 percent of the FPL. We found that the estimated increase in the probability of having a 
primary care doctor shrinks roughly in half (from about 4 to 2 percentage points) and becomes slightly statistically 
insignificant if we add the control for the state setting up its own exchange. This suggests some upward bias in the 
DD estimate due to unobserved differences in state attitudes toward the ACA, which we control for with our DDD 
approach. 
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Table 2: Effects of ACA on Health Care Access and Health Behaviors 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker Alcoholic 
Drinks 
per 
Month 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest 
Medicaid 
Expansion * 
Post 
−0.013 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.113) 
−0.022* 
(0.009) 
0.087 
(0.538) 
Post * 
Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.259*** 
(0.030) 
0.148** 
(0.049) 
−0.127*** 
(0.031) 
0.119* 
(0.051) 
−0.087 
(0.405) 
−0.0006 
(0.046) 
3.290 
(2.119) 
Medicaid 
Expansion * 
Post * 
Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.152** 
(0.045) 
0.007 
(0.065) 
−0.123** 
(0.042) 
0.060 
(0.067) 
−0.040 
(0.528) 
0.054 
(0.045) 
−0.607 
(2.397) 
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
ACA 
without 
Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.053*** 
(0.006) 
0.030** 
(0.010) 
−0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.024* 
(0.010) 
−0.018 
(0.082) 
−0.0001 
(0.009) 
0.667 
(0.429) 
Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
−0.025** 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
−0.008 
(0.107) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
−0.123 
(0.486) 
Full ACA 
(with 
Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.083*** 
(0.010) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
−0.051*** 
(0.010) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
−0.026 
(0.094) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.544 
(0.571) 
Pretreatment 
Mean and 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Outcome 
0.811 
(0.391) 
0.742 
(0.437) 
0.183 
(0.386) 
0.635 
(0.481) 
27.951 
(6.375) 
0.208 
(0.406) 
14.285 
(35.824) 
Sample Size 1,322,370 1,321,567 1,071,238 1,072,537 1,264,243 1,300,819 1,225,053 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. BRFSS sampling 
weights are used. All regressions include state * location type and year * location type fixed effects as well as the 
controls. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. 
 
 
Combining the effects of the private and Medicaid components shows that the fully 
implemented ACA led to large gains in all access measures. At the average pretreatment 
uninsured rate, insurance coverage increased by 8.3 percentage points, probability of having a 
primary care doctor rose by 3.1 percentage points, probability of cost being a barrier to care fell 
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by 5.1 percentage points, and probability of having a checkup rose by 3.6 percentage points. 
Based on the sample means for the outcomes reported in table 2, these results imply that the full 
ACA reduced the uninsured rate by 44 percent while also reducing the number of people without 
a primary care doctor by 12 percent, those with foregone care because of cost by 28 percent, and 
those not having an annual checkup by 10 percent. These magnitudes equate to 21 percent, 7.1 
percent, 13.2 percent, and 7.5 percent of the respective outcomes’ standard deviations. 
The remaining three columns of table 2 report the results for the three health behavior 
variables: BMI, probability of being a smoker, and drinks per month. We observe no statistically 
significant effects of the private portion, Medicaid expansion, or overall ACA on any of these 
outcomes. The signs are mixed, with the full ACA reducing BMI but increasing smoking and 
drinking. The magnitudes are relatively small compared to those for the access outcomes. The 
estimated effects of the full ACA at the mean pretreatment uninsured rate on BMI, smoking, and 
drinking are just –0.1 percent, 5.3 percent, and 3.8 percent of the corresponding sample means 
and –0.4 percent, 2.7 percent, and 1.5 percent of the corresponding standard deviations. Our 
findings for the Medicaid expansion are consistent with the null effects on risky behaviors found 
by Simon, Soni, and Cawley (2017) using DD methods and a sample of only low-income adults. 
 Table 3 displays the results for the self-assessed health outcomes. We find no 
statistically significant effects of either the private or Medicaid components of the ACA on any 
of the outcomes. Again, the signs are mixed, with the point estimates suggesting that the full 
ACA improved physical and mental health but worsened overall health and days with functional 
limitations. The magnitudes are relatively small, as implied effects of the full ACA represent just 
–0.37 percent (–0.4 percent), –1.4 percent (–0.6 percent), –3.7 percent (–1.8 percent), and 4.2 
percent (1.5 percent) of the pretreatment means (standard deviations) of very good or excellent 
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health, days not in good physical health, days not in good mental health, and days with health-
related limitations, respectively. Our small and insignificant estimates contrast with the large, 
early improvements in these same self-assessed health outcomes seen after the Massachusetts 
health care reform (Van der Wees, Zaslavsky, and Ayanian 2013; Courtemanche and Zapata 
2014) and randomized Oregon Medicaid experiment (Finkelstein et al. 2012). However, our null 
results for the Medicaid expansion are consistent with the lack of clear improvements in self-
assessed health found by the DD studies in the ACA Medicaid expansion literature (Sommers et 
al. 2015; Abramowitz 2016; Simon, Soni, and Cawley 2017). 
 
Table 3: Effects of ACA on Self-Assessed Health 
 Very Good 
or 
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest     
Medicaid Expansion * Post 0.009 
(0.008) 
−0.171 
(0.111) 
0.006 
(0.210) 
−0.334* 
(0.165) 
Post * Pretreatment Uninsured 0.028 
(0.0327) 
−0.584 
(0.555) 
−0.396 
(0.763) 
−0.595 
(0.695) 
Medicaid Expansion * Post * 
Pretreatment Uninsured 
−0.036 
(0.041) 
0.336 
(0.537) 
−0.337 
(0.878) 
1.114 
(0.811) 
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
ACA without Medicaid Expansion 0.006 
(0.006) 
−0.118 
(0.112) 
−0.080 
(0.155) 
−0.121 
(0.141) 
Medicaid Expansion −0.007 
(0.008) 
0.068 
(0.108) 
−0.068 
(0.178) 
0.226 
(0.164) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) −0.002 
(0.010) 
−0.050 
(0.126) 
−0.149 
(0.126) 
0.105 
(0.154) 
Pretreatment Mean and Standard 
Deviation 
0.537 
(0.499) 
3.634 
(7.948) 
4.071 
(8.169) 
2.500 
(6.777) 
Sample Size 1,321,799 1,309,624 1,310,641 1,316,271 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. BRFSS 
sampling weights are used. All regressions include state * location type and year * location type fixed effects as well 
as the controls. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. 
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The reported results in tables 2 and 3 only compute impacts of the ACA at the mean 
pretreatment uninsured rate of 20.2 percent. Because area pretreatment uninsured rates varied 
widely, ranging from 3 to 36 percent with a standard deviation of 8 percent, this approach 
disguises a great deal of heterogeneity. Figure 4 therefore shows how the predicted changes in 
our access outcomes vary across this range of uninsured rates in both expansion and 
nonexpansion states. The effects on the health behavior and self-assessed health outcomes are 
never significant at any uninsured rate, so we do not present similar graphs for them.  
The predicted effect of the full ACA on the probability of having insurance coverage 
reached as high as 14.7 percentage points in the area with the highest pretreatment uninsured 
 
Figure 4: ACA’s Effects on Access Outcomes at Pretreatment Uninsured Rates 
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rate. Without the Medicaid expansion, this impact only reached 9.3 percentage points. The 
predicted impact of the full ACA on the probability of having a primary care doctor extends to 
5.6 percentage points at the highest uninsured rate, with essentially no difference between 
Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states. For the cost barrier and well-patient checkup 
outcomes, the maximum predicted effects of the ACA are 9 percentage points and 6.4 percentage 
points, respectively, in Medicaid expansion states and 4.5 and 4.3 in nonexpansion states. 
Lastly, the results for the robustness checks are available in online appendix tables A2–
A12 (one table for each outcome).18 In almost all cases, the findings from the baseline 
regressions persist across the various robustness checks. 
 
6. Instrumental Variables 
A natural question with interpretation of the reduced-form results from the preceding section is 
whether we can assume that the extensive margin of insurance coverage is the only mechanism 
through which the ACA affected the other outcomes. If this is true, then it would be reasonable 
to estimate an instrumental variables (IV) specification in which 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are instruments and insurance coverage is the 
endogenous variable.19 This assumption is difficult to test and may not hold if, for instance, areas 
with higher baseline uninsured rates also had higher rates of underinsurance (e.g., bare-bones 
privately purchased policies), in which case the intensive margin of coverage quality is another 
mechanism through which our treatment variables could affect the other outcomes. Moreover, 
general equilibrium effects are possible; for instance, in areas with large numbers of newly 
                                                          
18 The online appendix is available at http://www2.gsu.edu/~ecojhm/courtemanche_et_al_SEJ_online_appendix.pdf. 
19 We are not able to estimate an IV model with both private and Medicaid coverage as endogenous variables 
because the BRFSS does not contain information on source of coverage. 
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insured residents, continuously covered individuals may face increased difficulty accessing 
providers, while those working in the health care industry may experience positive income 
shocks. For these reasons, we prefer to emphasize our reduced-form approach, as it allows for all 
of these mechanisms. Nonetheless, IV results can be informative about how large the effects of 
coverage on the other health care access outcomes would need to be for the extensive margin of 
coverage to be the only relevant mechanism. Moreover, for the risky behavior and self-assessed 
health outcomes, they provide further insight as to whether the null estimates are large or small 
in magnitude.  
Results from the IV model—with the full set of controls and fixed effects included—are 
presented in table 4. In each column, we present the second-stage coefficient estimate for the 
health insurance variable along with its standard error, the first stage F statistic from the test of 
joint significance of the two instruments, and the p value for the overidentification test. In this 
case, the overidentification test essentially tests the null hypothesis that the estimated local 
average treatment effects of insurance would be statistically indistinguishable if either 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 or 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 were used as the sole 
instrument. A rejection of the null hypothesis could therefore mean either that the effect of 
gaining coverage via the Medicaid expansion is different from the effect of gaining coverage 
through the private component of the ACA (in which case the IV specification captures a 
weighted average of these two effects), or that the Medicaid and private expansions activate 
other mechanisms besides simply the extensive margin of coverage (in which case the IV 
specification would be inappropriate).  
The results show that the estimated effects of insurance on the other access outcomes are 
large and highly significant. Specifically, insurance coverage increases the probability of having  
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effects of Health Insurance  
 Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker 
Any Insurance 0.446*** 
(0.080) 
−0.469*** 
(0.075) 
0.357*** 
(0.092) 
−0.198 
(1.250) 
0.085 
(0.076) 
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation of 
Outcome 
0.742 
(0.437) 
0.183 
(0.386) 
0.635 
(0.481) 
27.951 
(6.375) 
0.208 
(0.406) 
Sample Size 1,319,215 1,069,336 1,070,619 1,261,976 1,298,452 
First-Stage F Statistic 618.16 704.79 703.35 630.63 626.53 
Overidentification Test 
P-Value 
0.001 0.144 0.721 0.932 0.072 
      
 Drinks per 
Month 
Very Good 
or 
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Any Insurance 9.018 
(7.866) 
0.022 
(0.092) 
−0.947 
(1.520) 
−1.676 
(1.615) 
0.168 
(1.268) 
Pretreatment Mean and 
Standard Deviation of 
Outcome 
14.285 
(35.824) 
0.537 
(0.499) 
3.634 
(7.948) 
4.071 
(8.169) 
2.500 
(6.777) 
Sample Size 1,265,867 1,319,344 1,307,254 1,308,281 1,313,883 
First-Stage F Statistic 616.48 615.03 600.74 609.30 614.19 
Overidentification Test 
P-Value 
0.420 0.078 0.189 0.908 0.001 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. BRFSS sampling 
weights are used. All regressions include state * location type and year * location type fixed effects as well as the 
controls. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. 
 
a primary care doctor by 45 percentage points and the probability of having a well-patient doctor 
visit by 36 percentage points, while decreasing the probability of having foregone care by 47 
percentage points. These are large effects that may be overstated because of the presence of other 
possible mechanisms, as discussed above. Nonetheless, in our view, effects of this general size 
are plausible, as they are in the same vicinity as the IV estimates from the Oregon Medicaid 
experiment. Specifically, Finkelstein et al. (2012) found that Medicaid coverage increased 
similar access outcomes by 20–34 percentage points after just one year. Our coefficient estimates 
imply that having insurance increases the probabilities of having a primary care doctor, a well 
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patient checkup, and no unmet medical needs because of cost by 60 percent, 56 percent, and 57 
percent of the corresponding pretreatment sample rates and 102 percent, 122 percent, and 74 
percent of the standard deviations.   
The estimated effects of insurance on risky behavior and self-assessed health outcomes 
are all statistically insignificant, as would be expected given the lack of significance in the 
reduced-form regressions. The magnitudes are quite small for three of the seven outcomes. 
Having insurance reduces BMI by only 0.2 units, or 0.7 percent of the sample mean and 3.1 
percent of the standard deviation. In contrast, the magnitudes were much larger in the cases from 
the prior literature where health insurance coverage has been estimated to have a statistically 
significant impact on BMI. Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) found that insurance decreased 
BMI by 3.8 units using the Massachusetts reform as an instrument, while Barbaresco, 
Courtemanche, and Qi’s (2015) results from the ACA’s dependent coverage mandate imply that 
insurance reduced BMI by 1.6 units.  
Similarly, our estimated effect of insurance coverage on the probability of being in very 
good or excellent health is just 2.2 percentage points, or 4.1 percent of the mean and 4.4 percent 
of the standard deviation. Again, this magnitude is far smaller than those from the prior studies 
where the effect of insurance on overall self-assessed health has been statistically significant. For 
instance, Finkelstein et al. (2012) found that, in the context of the Oregon Medicaid experiment, 
health insurance raised the probability of being in good or better health by 13 percentage points. 
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) estimated that the effect of insurance gained from the MA 
reform on the probability of very good or excellent health was 23 percentage points. For days 
with health-related limitations, the magnitude of our IV estimate is just 0.17 days, or 6.7 percent 
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of the mean and 2.5 percent of the standard deviation. The analogous estimates from Finkelstein 
et al. (2012) and Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) were −1.3 and −1.6 days, respectively. 
For the remaining four outcomes, the magnitudes are more substantial if taken literally in 
spite of their statistical insignificance. Insurance coverage is estimated to increase the probability 
of being a smoker by 8.5 percentage points, or 41 percent of the sample mean and 21 percent of 
the sample standard deviation, and the number of drinks per month by 63 percent of the mean 
and 25 percent of the standard deviation. Yet obtaining coverage reduces the number of days not 
in good physical and mental health by 0.95 and 1.68 days per month, respectively. These 
magnitudes represent 26 percent and 41 percent of the respective means and 12 percent and 21 
percent of the standard deviations. They are also in the general vicinity of the statistically 
significant estimates from prior studies. For instance, Finkelstein et al. (2012) found that health 
insurance coverage reduced days not in good physical and mental health by 1.3 and 2.1 days, 
respectively, while Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) found reductions of 1.1 and 1.3 days for 
these outcomes. 
In sum, the IV estimates provide new insights regarding magnitudes. If our ACA 
treatment variables only influence the outcomes via the extensive margin of insurance coverage, 
then the gains in health care access from obtaining health insurance coverage from the ACA are 
very large, but broadly consistent with those estimated elsewhere. The effects of ACA-induced 
insurance coverage on risky behaviors and self-assessed health, however, are less clear. All are 
statistically insignificant, with three being small, two being large in the direction of better health, 
and two being large in the direction of worse health. Together, these results suggest that the ACA 
did not discernably impact health in either direction in its first two years, but that future research 
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with additional years of data and a larger sample size is necessary before reaching a definitive 
conclusion.  
Our instruments generally perform well in the diagnostic tests. They generate first stage F 
statistics that are more than an order of magnitude above the weak instrument threshold of 10. 
The overidentification test only rejects the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level for primary care 
doctor and days with health limitations, and some rejections are to be expected given the 
potential for the Medicaid and private portions of the ACA to induce very different local average 
treatment effects of insurance coverage.  
 
7. Event Study Model 
We next return to the reduced-form model and evaluate its key identifying assumptions. First, 
conditional on the controls, changes in our outcomes in 2014–2015 would not have been 
correlated with pretreatment uninsured rates in the absence of the ACA. Second, differential 
changes in 2014–2015 between Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states would not have 
been correlated with pretreatment uninsured rates. We indirectly assess the plausibility of these 
assumptions by estimating an event study model that includes the interactions of the treatment 
variables with the full set of year fixed effects, with 2013 being the base year. The model is 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2011𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃2(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2012𝑖𝑖) + 
𝜃𝜃3(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2014𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃4(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2015𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃5(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2011𝑖𝑖)+ 𝜃𝜃6(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2012𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃7(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2014𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃8(𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
∗ 𝑌𝑌2015𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃9(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2011𝑖𝑖)+ 𝜃𝜃10(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2012𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃11(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2014𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃12(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌2015𝑖𝑖) 
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+𝜽𝜽𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                             (2) 
where Y2011t, Y2012t, Y2014t, and Y2015t are indicators for whether year t is 2011, 2012, 2014, 
or 2015, respectively. The tests for differential pretreatment trends (i.e., falsification tests) are 
provided by evaluating whether the coefficients on the “treatment” variables in the pretreatment 
years (θ1, θ2, θ9, θ10) are equal to zero.20 
Table 5 presents the event study results for the seven outcomes related to health care 
access and health behaviors, and table 6 presents similar results for the four outcomes related to 
self-assessed health using the full set of controls. In each table, the top panel presents the 
coefficient estimates of interest. Between the two tables, there are a total of 44 falsification tests 
(four parameters of interest in each of 11 regressions) and only three significant results at the 5 
percent level. Three out of 44 is 6.8 percent, which is only slightly higher than would be 
expected by chance. These results therefore provide some reassurance about the validity of our 
model to estimate causal effects for the “true” ACA. 
Another advantage of the event study specification is that it allows us to distinguish 
between the effects of the ACA in 2014 and 2015. The most notable result is that the coverage 
gains from the ACA appear to have increased in the second year relative to the first year, with 
the increase coming entirely from the private portion. Specifically, in 2014, the fully 
implemented ACA increased the probability of a nonelderly adult being insured by 6.6 
percentage points, with 3.9 percentage points coming from the private portion and the remaining 
2.7 percentage points from Medicaid. These magnitudes are similar to those estimated by 
Courtemanche et al. (2017) using the ACS data. In contrast, in 2015, the coverage gain from the  
                                                          
20 Recall that the coefficient on the 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  variable in our main regression was assumed to capture 
unobserved confounders rather than part of the causal effect of the Medicaid expansion. We therefore do not 
consider θ1 and θ2 to provide additional falsification tests. 
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Table 5: Event Study Regressions for Health Care Access and Health Behaviors 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks 
per 
Month 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest (2013 is base year) 
2011 * 
Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.018 
(0.069) 
−0.057 
(0.059) 
0.094 
(0.060) 
−0.296*** 
(0.087) 
0.602 
(0.723) 
0.035 
(0.043) 
−5.326 
(3.366) 
2012 * 
Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
−0.052 
(0.067) 
−0.022 
(0.081) 
−0.011 
(0.056) 
−0.173* 
(0.066) 
−0.950 
(0.622) 
0.022 
(0.046) 
0.926 
(4.642) 
2014 * 
Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.193*** 
(0.046) 
0.115** 
(0.045) 
−0.129** 
(0.054) 
−0.0143 
(0.050) 
−0.435 
(0.723) 
0.010 
(0.050) 
8.360* 
(3.968) 
2015 * 
Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.310*** 
(0.066) 
0.140 
(0.117) 
−0.106** 
(0.052) 
−0.021 
(0.088) 
−0.623 
(0.614) 
0.041 
(0.041) 
−3.211 
(3.336) 
Medicaid 
Expansion * 2011 
* Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.027 
(0.075) 
0.054 
(0.074) 
−0.047 
(0.045) 
0.096 
(0.081) 
−0.167 
(0.834) 
−0.046 
(0.048) 
0.462 
(5.479) 
Medicaid 
Expansion * 2012 
* Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
−0.001 
(0.106) 
0.113 
(0.103) 
−0.006 
(0.047) 
0.039 
(0.053) 
1.552 
(0.809) 
−0.094 
(0.052) 
−10.885 
(5.856) 
Medicaid 
Expansion * 2014 
* Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.134* 
(0.062) 
0.011 
(0.074) 
−0.005 
(0.050) 
0.046 
(0.060) 
−0.391 
(0.916) 
0.019 
(0.050) 
−8.835* 
(4.117) 
Medicaid 
Expansion * 2015 
* Pretreatment 
Uninsured 
0.197* 
(0.082) 
0.083 
(0.115) 
−0.142** 
(0.048) 
0.100 
(0.077) 
1.171 
(0.793) 
−0.024 
(0.042) 
−0.428 
(3.684) 
        
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate 
ACA without 
Medicaid 
Expansion in 2014 
0.039*** 
(0.009) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
−0.026* 
(0.001) 
−0.003 
(0.010) 
−0.088 
(0.146) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
1.695* 
(0.805) 
ACA without 
Medicaid 
Expansion in 2015 
0.063*** 
(0.013) 
0.028 
(0.024) 
−0.022* 
(0.010) 
−0.004 
(0.018) 
−0.126 
(0.124) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
−0.651 
(0.677) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid 
Expansion) in 
2014 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.015) 
−0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
−0.009 
(0.128) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
−0.096 
(0.752) 
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 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks 
per 
Month 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid 
Expansion) in 
2015 
0.103*** 
(0.013) 
0.045** 
(0.014) 
−0.050*** 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
0.111 
(0.182) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
−0.564 
(0.845) 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. BRFSS sampling 
weights are used. All regressions include state * location type and year * location type fixed effects as well as the 
controls. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. 
 
Table 6: Event Study Regressions for Self-Assessed Health 
 Days in 
Very 
Good or 
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not 
in Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not 
in Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest (2013 is base year) 
2011 * Pretreatment Uninsured −0.062 
(0.047) 
0.922 
(1.606) 
1.492 
(1.191) 
1.056 
(0.687) 
2012 * Pretreatment Uninsured 0.134 
(0.076) 
1.477 
(1.664) 
1.120 
(0.769) 
1.375* 
(0.650) 
2014 * Pretreatment Uninsured 0.080* 
(0.033) 
−0.515 
(1.142) 
−0.213 
(0.836) 
−0.292 
(0.625) 
2015 * Pretreatment Uninsured 0.088 
(0.072) 
0.358 
(0.907) 
1.300 
(0.649) 
0.370 
(0.761) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2011 * 
Pretreatment Uninsured 
0.007 
(0.070) 
−1.221 
(1.457) 
−0.686 
(1.309) 
−1.093 
(0.735) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2012 * 
Pretreatment Uninsured 
−0.087 
(0.089) 
0.447 
(1.383) 
−0.794 
(0.846) 
−0.361 
(0.552) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2014 * 
Pretreatment Uninsured 
−0.081 
(0.059) 
0.715 
(1.236) 
−1.344 
(0.774) 
0.599 
(0.997) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2015 * 
Pretreatment Uninsured 
−0.066 
(0.092) 
−0.072 
(1.062) 
−0.855 
(1.019) 
0.873 
(0.847) 
ACA without Medicaid Expansion in 
2014 
0.016* 
(0.007) 
−0.105 
(0.232) 
−0.043 
(0.170) 
−0.059 
(0.127) 
ACA without Medicaid Expansion in 
2015 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.073 
(0.184) 
0.263 
(0.132) 
0.075 
(0.154) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) in 
2014 
−0.0002 
(0.011) 
0.040 
(0.176) 
−0.316* 
(0.134) 
0.063 
(0.199) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) in 
2015 
0.004 
(0.014) 
0.058 
(0.175) 
0.090 
(0.150) 
0.252 
(0.168) 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. BRFSS sampling 
weights are used. All regressions include state * location type and year * location type fixed effects as well as the 
controls. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. 
Table 5 (Continued) 
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full ACA jumped to 10.3 percentage points, with 6.3 percentage points coming from the private 
component and 4 percentage points coming from Medicaid.21 Accordingly, the gains in primary 
care access and reductions in cost barriers also increased in 2015 relative to 2014, though these 
increases appear to have come entirely from the Medicaid expansion. The event study design 
also causes a few sporadic results to emerge for the health behavior and self-assessed health 
outcomes. In particular, the fully implemented ACA reduced days in poor mental health in 2014 
(but not 2015). Such results, however, could simply be a byproduct of the large number of 
hypotheses tested by the event study models. 
 
8. Analyses Stratifying by Income 
One possible explanation for the large number of null results, particularly for the Medicaid 
expansion, might be that the full sample includes various groups of people with different 
probabilities of being treated by the ACA. In this section, we examine whether more effects 
show up if we “zoom in” on those with low to middle incomes who were most likely to receive 
free or subsidized insurance as a result of the ACA. Unfortunately, perhaps due to the demanding 
nature of the DDD specification and the need for each subsample to have sufficient numbers of 
individuals in each area to reliably compute pretreatment uninsured rates, splitting the sample 
into three or more groups results in estimates that are too imprecise to be useful. We therefore 
simply stratify into two groups of approximately equal size: those above and those below the 
median household income. 
Tables 7 and 8 report the results. It is reassuring that the sizeable gains in access were 
concentrated in the below-median-income subsample. The increase in insurance coverage from 
the full ACA was 11.9 percentage points for the lower-income group—with the majority of this 
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increase coming from the Medicaid expansion—compared with 2.0 percentage points for the 
higher-income group. The gains in the other access outcomes appear to have been entirely 
concentrated among the lower-income subsample. For this group, the effects on having a primary 
care doctor and an annual checkup were driven mostly by the private portion of the ACA, while 
the reduction in cost barriers was driven mostly by the Medicaid expansion.  
The results on risky health behaviors and self-assessed health generally show the same 
null effects we saw in table 3, with a few exceptions. Most notably, one improvement in the self-
assessed health outcomes emerges for the lower-income subsample: a reduction in days not in 
good mental health in expansion states. We also observe a few mixed results for health 
behaviors. The private portion of the ACA increased drinks per month, while the Medicaid 
expansion decreased drinking by a similar amount, leading to a null effect of the full ACA. 
Additionally, the Medicaid expansion increased smoking among the higher income subsample, a 
result that seems likely to be spurious since this group would not have qualified for Medicaid. 
We are reluctant to emphasize these few significant results since they do not seem to fit a 
broader pattern, and we would expect a couple of “effects” to emerge simply by chance given the 
large number of null hypotheses we are testing in these tables.22 Overall, there is little evidence 
                                                          
21 Our finding of additional coverage gains in 2015 is consistent with the Cohen, Martinez, and Zammitti (2016) 
descriptive examination of changes over time in coverage using the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). They 
report in their table 17 that among nonelderly adults, the increase in those reporting coverage of any type was 4.1 
percentage points between 2013 and 2014 and 3.5 percentage points between 2014 and 2015. For public (private) 
coverage, their table 18 (19) suggests the increase was 1.0 (3.1) percentage point(s) between 2013 and 2014 and 1.2 
(2.4) percentage points between 2014 and 2015. 
22 We also stratified the sample by education, splitting the sample into those with less than a college degree and 
those with a college degree or higher. The patterns produced by our education stratification largely mimic the 
findings from our income stratification analysis, so are not reported. Additionally, we stratified the sample by age 
and found some evidence of gains in self-assessed health among the older half of the sample if we split it at the 
median. However, these results were not robust to small changes in the age cutoff used to split the sample. Results 
from the education and age subsample analyses are available upon request. 
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that the ACA influenced health behaviors or self-assessed health in the first two years, even for 
the lower-income subsample that experienced the largest gains in access. 
 
9. Discussion 
In this paper, we used data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System to examine the 
effects of the 2014 ACA provisions on health care access, risky health behaviors, and self-
assessed health. Using a DDD strategy that exploits variation in time, pretreatment uninsured 
rates, and state Medicaid expansion status, we separately estimated the effects in both Medicaid 
expansion and nonexpansion states. The results suggest that the ACA improved access to care 
along all observable dimensions—including health insurance coverage, having a primary care 
doctor and a well-patient checkup in the past year, and cost barriers—in both expansion and 
nonexpansion states. The gain in coverage and reduction in cost barriers were significantly 
greater in expansion states. The magnitudes of the estimates imply effects of insurance on health 
care access that are at least as large as those observed in the Oregon Medicaid experiment.  
Our lack of significant results for risky health behaviors suggests that the ex ante moral 
hazard, improved access to health-behavior-promoting medical care, and income effects brought 
about by insurance coverage either offset each other or are too small to be statistically detectable 
in our sample. The extent of ex ante moral hazard may be modest because the consumption value 
of good health may be a sufficient deterrent even if an individual is insulated from the financial 
consequences of illness. Improved access to medical care may be of only limited value with 
regard to health behaviors since they are generally not as easy to treat as acute conditions. 
Income effects may also be relatively small given the mixed results in the literature as to the 
 
 
45 
 
causal impact of income on health behaviors and the potential for individuals to value in-kind 
spending on health insurance at less than its cost.23  
Our inability to find clear evidence that the ACA improved self-assessed health contrasts 
the large, immediate gains in similar outcomes observed after the Oregon Medicaid experiment 
(Finkelstein et al. 2012) and the Massachusetts reform (Van der Wees, Zaslavsky, and Ayanian 
2013; Courtemanche and Zapata 2014). The Oregon experiment was unique in that it was purely 
among low-income individuals who had demonstrated some interest in their health by actively 
registering for the lottery. The effects of the Massachusetts reform could plausibly differ from 
those of the ACA for several reasons, including differences in population demographics, the fact 
that the Massachusetts reform’s insurance expansions for adults were done completely through 
private coverage as opposed to a mix of public and private coverage, and the greater prevalence 
of high deductibles in the ACA’s private plans (Wharam, Ross-Degnan, and Rosenthal 2013). 
Another possible explanation is the relative lack of popularity of the ACA compared to these 
other interventions.24 It has been hypothesized that the large, immediate gains in self-assessed 
health after insurance expansions may be attributable at least in part to a “warm glow” from 
gaining coverage (e.g., winning the lottery in Oregon, receiving insurance through a popular 
program in Massachusetts) rather than from actually utilizing additional medical care 
                                                          
23 See Cawley and Ruhm (2012) for an overview of the literature on the effect of income on risky health behaviors. 
Subsequent to their literature review, additional papers using natural experiments have continued to find mixed 
results (e.g., Adams, Blackburn, and Cotti 2012; Averett and Wang 2013; Kenkel, Schmeiser, and Urban 2014; 
Apouey and Clark 2015; Au and Johnston 2015; and Cowan and White 2015). Around 84 percent of individuals 
with a marketplace plan in 2015 qualified for an advance premium tax credit (PTC); conditional on qualifying, the 
advance PTC was $272 per month. See CMS (2016). Gallen (2015) finds that each $1.00 of Medicaid spending is 
valued at $0.26–$0.35 to participants. 
24 Blendon et al. (2008) report that in June 2008, two years after the implementation of the Massachusetts health care 
reform, 69 percent of residents supported the law. In contrast, a tracking poll conducted by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation stated that in December 2016, only 43 percent of adults viewed the ACA favorably. For further 
information on this poll, see KFF (2017). 
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(Finkelstein et al. 2012; Courtemanche and Zapata 2014). Perhaps the amount of “warm glow” is 
smaller if the intervention bringing about the coverage is controversial, such as with the ACA.  
Several caveats of our work provide directions for future research. For instance, 
investigation of clinical health outcomes is necessary to provide a fuller picture of the ACA’s 
health effects. Additionally, future studies should continue to track the indicators used in our 
paper over a longer period, as the effects of insurance on health could take many years to fully 
materialize or could require a larger sample to be statistically detectable. Next, our identification 
strategy implicitly assumes that effects of the ACA are concentrated among those who lacked 
coverage prior to the law’s implementation. Future research should investigate whether impacts 
could also occur among, for instance, those who switched from catastrophic to more 
comprehensive coverage as a result of the ACA’s minimum standards for insurance plans, or 
who experienced significant income shocks as a result of the subsidies or changes in premiums.25 
Finally, understanding the ACA’s effects on health care access and health outcomes provides 
only part of the story with regard to evaluating the welfare effects of the law. For instance, 
protection against financial risk is a critical component of the gains from insurance, so the 
consumption-smoothing benefits of the ACA could confer a sizeable benefit even in the absence 
of discernable short-run health effects. Hu et al. (2016) found evidence from credit report data 
that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion improved financial outcomes. But Pauly (2017) questions 
whether the poor should be allowed to purchase high-deductible marketplace plans. The ACA 
also contains a number of other components unrelated to insurance coverage, such as provider 
                                                          
25 For instance, 7.7 percent of nonelderly adults directly purchased individual coverage prior to the 2014 reforms 
(author’s calculations using the ACS). For these individuals, the ACA’s premium tax credit could directly substitute 
for household income devoted to health insurance. While many of these people likely experienced positive income 
shocks, some may have been spending less on insurance prior to the ACA, perhaps because they were purchasing 
noncomprehensive policies (Clemans-Cope and Anderson 2014). Thus, it is possible that the share of their budget 
spent on health insurance could have increased even in the presence of the subsidies. 
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payment reforms and tax increases, that each represent a part of the overall picture. Thus, both 
the size and scope of the ACA have generated the need for a great deal of future research in 
order to better understand the multifaceted nature of its impacts.  
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Table 7: Income Below Median Subsample 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.316) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker 
ACA w/o 
Medicaid  
0.052** 
(0.017) 
0.041** 
(0.013) 
−0.016 
(0.009) 
0.046* 
(0.018) 
−0.006 
(0.153) 
−0.005 
(0.012) 
Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.067** 
(0.026) 
−0.002 
(0.021) 
−0.044* 
(0.017) 
−0.010 
(0.023) 
−0.091 
(0.209) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
Full ACA 
(w/Medicaid) 
0.119*** 
(0.019) 
0.038* 
(0.017) 
−0.060** 
(0.019) 
0.035 
(0.018) 
−0.098 
(0.165) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
Pretreatment 
Mean and 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.674 
(0.469) 
0.664 
(0.472) 
0.289 
(0.453) 
0.581 
(0.493) 
28.344 
(6.766) 
0.276 
(0.447) 
Sample Size 672,937 672,627 548,521 549,596 638,395 660,975 
       
 Drinks 
per 
Month 
Very 
Good or 
Excellent 
Health 
Days Not 
in Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not 
in Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
 
ACA w/o 
Medicaid  
1.728* 
(0.693) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
−0.316 
(0.159) 
−0.300 
(0.243) 
−0.388 
(0.247) 
 
Medicaid 
Expansion 
−1.399* 
(0.643) 
−0.002 
(0.015) 
0.187 
(0.245) 
−0.233 
(0.300) 
0.504 
(0.360) 
 
Full ACA 
(w/Medicaid) 
0.330 
(0.816) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
−0.129 
(0.232) 
−0.533* 
(0.233) 
0.116 
(0.282) 
 
Pretreatment 
Mean and 
Standard 
Deviation 
12.508 
(37.676) 
0.426 
(0.495) 
4.798 
(9.052) 
5.276 
(9.262) 
3.482 
(7.969) 
 
Sample Size 640,349 672,765 663,572 664,825 668,102  
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. BRFSS sampling 
weights are used. All regressions include state * location type and year * location type fixed effects as well as the 
controls. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. 
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Table 8: Income above Median Subsample 
(Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.062) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker 
ACA w/o 
Medicaid 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
−0.003 
(0.005) 
−0.006 
(0.012) 
−0.019 
(0.061) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Medicaid 
Expansion 
−0.007 
(0.006) 
−0.006 
(0.008) 
−0.004 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.084 
(0.101) 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
Full ACA 
(w/Medicaid) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
−0.007 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.065 
(0.110) 
0.020** 
(0.007) 
Pretreatment 
Mean and 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.933 
(0.249) 
0.837 
(0.369) 
0.070 
(0.255) 
0.684 
(0.465) 
27.289 
(5.580) 
0.141 
(0.348) 
Sample Size 649,433 648,940 522,717 522,941 625,848 639,844 
       
 Drinks 
per 
Month 
Very 
Good or 
Excellent 
Health 
Days Not 
in Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not 
in Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
 
ACA w/o 
Medicaid 
−0.335 
(0.340) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
−0.064 
(0.071) 
0.095 
(0.093) 
−0.017 
(0.057) 
 
Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.863 
(0.452) 
−0.009 
(0.008) 
0.048 
(0.111) 
0.112 
(0.137) 
0.046 
(0.084) 
 
Full ACA 
(w/Medicaid) 
0.528 
(0.509) 
−0.007 
(0.008) 
−0.017 
(0.111) 
0.207 
(0.115) 
0.029 
(0.085) 
 
Pretreatment 
Mean and 
Standard 
Deviation 
16.474 
(33.297) 
0.675 
(0.468) 
2.214 
(6.000) 
2.651 
(6.330) 
1.283 
(4.605) 
 
Sample Size 627,768 649,034 646,052 643,712 648,169  
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. BRFSS sampling 
weights are used. All regressions include state * location type and year * location type fixed effects as well as the 
controls. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. 
 
